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A VIEW FROM WITHIN THE FORTUNE 500:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NEGATIVE VALUE CLASS ACTIONS AND DETERRENCE
Linda Sandstrom Simard 1

Introduction
The American civil justice system relies heavily upon private
enforcement to deter and redress corporate wrongdoing. Theoretically,
civil litigation deters wrongful conduct by threatening liability for harm
caused by such conduct. The threat of liability increases the potential
cost of the conduct and induces corporations to invest in precautions to
avoid harm. When deterrence fails, the imposition of liability redresses
the harm by compensating the victim. This private enforcement
regulatory model collapses, however, when litigation is not
economically viable. Specifically, when the cost of pursuing litigation
exceeds the expected recovery, there is no incentive to file suit, no
threat of liability to deter wrongful conduct and no compensation for
victims. Thus, when a manufacturer sells a million gas grills by falsely
advertising that they are “Made in U.S.A.” when in fact some of the
parts are imported, 2 or an insurance company wrongfully rounds
premiums up to the nearest whole dollar on hundreds of thousands of
policies, 3 or a financial management company fraudulently induces
stockholders to hold onto over-valued stock by misstating corporate
earnings, 4 there is no incentive for an individual to file suit because the
cost of litigation exceeds the expected recovery. While these injuries
are admittedly quite small to each individual, turning a blind eye
suggests to corporations that it is acceptable to engage in wrongful
conduct that nickels and dimes the masses.
In 1966, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee amended the
federal class action rule to address “the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
1

Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. I would like to thank Joseph
Glannon, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Thomas Main, Andrew Perlman, and Jay Tidmarsh for
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, Caitlin Lee for valuable
research assistance and Donna Moray for extensive administrative assistance in
sending out the surveys and organizing the responses. Any remaining errors or
oversights are mine.
2
Knight Kiplinger, Is This Class Action Really A Shakedown?, Kiplinger’s Personal
Finance, Sept. 2012, at 15.
3
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Martinez, No. 04-96-00597-CV (Tex. Ct. Appl. 4th Dist.
1996); Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Sendejo, No. 04-96-00598 (Tex. Ct. App.
4th Dist. 1996).
4
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006)
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prosecuting his or her rights.” 5 The modern rule paved the way for socalled negative value class actions. 6 By aggregating groups of small
value claims together, the cost of litigation is shared by a class of
similarly situated claimants, thus enabling litigation of claims that would
otherwise never see the light of a courtroom.
Although the negative value class action arrived on the scene
nearly half a century ago, questions about its social utility remain
controversial to this day. John Frank, a member of the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee that drafted the amended rule, framed the
controversy aptly when he said:
For all our effort, we do not know whether this is a good or a
bad thing. The great big question is whether the social utility of
the large class action outweighs the limited benefits to
individuals, the aroma of gross profiteering, and the
transactional costs to the court. 7
The answer to the so-called “great big question” depends on whether
negative value class actions are an effective deterrent of wrongful
conduct. If they are, the costs associated with litigating a few rare
instances of undeterred harm are outweighed by the overwhelming
benefits of deterrence. If they are not, the costs associated with
litigating a large and recurring number of negative value class actions
are harder to justify in light of the small compensatory benefits
5

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)(discussing the
policy underlying negative value class actions).
6
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 904-906
(1987)(“Negative value class actions … refer to class actions where the costs in
establishing and collecting the individual claims are greater than the potential
th
recovery.”); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5 Cir.
2004)(“A ‘negative value’ suit is one in which class members’ claims would be
uneconomical to litigate individually.”) These actions are also referred to as
small stakes class actions, small value class actions and Type-B class actions.
See Brian Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2043, 2044 (2010)(using the phrase “small stakes” class action to refer to a
class action where the cost to litigate exceeds the expected recovery); Coffee,
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 904-906
(referring to positive value class actions as Type-A and negative value class
actions as Type-B); Martin Redish, Chifford Berlow, The Class Actin as Political
Theory, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 753, 793 (2007)(noting that the phrases “small value”
and “negative value” are interchangeable).
7
John P. Frank, Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to the Honorable Patrick E.
Higginbothom (Apr. 28, 1995)(on file with the Advisory Committee); Deborah
Hensler, Nicholas Pace, Bonita Dombey-Moore, Beth Giddens, Jennifer Gross,
Erik Moller, Class Action Dilemmas, Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, 256,
401 (2000) (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2000)[hereafter Class Action
Dilemmas].
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conferred on individuals. This paper delivers important new empirical
evidence that suggests negative value class actions are not as effective
at deterring wrongful conduct as theory has predicted.
This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of the
deterrent effect of negative value class action litigation from the
perspective of large, publicly traded companies. In Section I, the paper
begins with a brief discussion of the theory of deterrence. Section II
analyzes previous empirical studies of deterrence in a variety of legal
and factual contexts. While these studies inform our understanding of
deterrence theory generally, they reach conflicting conclusions
regarding the efficacy of litigation as a deterrent and they leave a
number of important questions unanswered. Section III then describes
the study that is the subject of this paper. The study presents new
evidence based upon data collected from corporate counsel of Fortune
500 companies regarding historical experience with negative value class
action litigation. Finally, armed with this new data, Section IV returns to
the question that has plagued negative value class actions for decades:
does the social utility of these actions outweigh the cost?
I.

The Theory of Deterrence

Deterrence theory relies on a simple, but largely untested,
assumption that the threat of civil liability induces actors to avoid
wrongful conduct by increasing the cost associated with that conduct. 8
This assumption flows from the following syllogism: (1) people are
rational actors who choose their actions out of self-interest; (2) selfinterest is economic and cost-benefit driven; (3) the imposition of
liability for harm caused by one’s conduct motivates actors to avoid
inefficient injuries. 9 Specifically, by threatening an actor with liability
for harm caused by wrongful conduct, an actor has an incentive to
invest in precautions up to the equilibrium point where an extra dollar
of precaution equals the additional risk avoided. 10 The following
8

W. Jonathan Cardi, Randy Penfield, Albert Yoon, Does Tort Law Deter? 9 J.
Empirical Legal studies 567, 568 (2012)(“Much of the law and economics
literature relies on this assumption as if it were analytic truth”). General
deterrence is focused on individual choice and relies upon cost/benefit
incentives to deter undesirable conduct. Guido Calabresi, The Cost of
Accidents, 68-69 (1970). Specific deterrence, on the other hand, involves a
collective decision, often by a legislative body, regarding how much of a specific
activity is allowed, who should participate in it, and how it should be
performed. Id. at 68, 95 (legislation prohibiting prostitution and murder are
examples of specific deterrence).
9
Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 2.
10
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 843 (2002) . For example, assume A
and B are drivers. On average, A incurs $200 in accident costs per year and B
incurs $25 in accident costs per year. Assume also that both A and B have the

3
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formula represents the theoretical deterrent value derived from a
threat of litigation:
EL * p + EC ≥ I
Where EL represents the expected loss 11; p represents the probability
that the actor will be liable for the harm 12; EC represents the expected
cost of defending the action; and I represents the investment in
precautions. The left side of the equation represents costs that may be
avoided if harm is averted; the right side of the equation represents an
efficient investment in precautions to avoid the harm. The formula
assumes that a rational actor will invest in precautions up to, but not
beyond, the expected value derived from avoiding harm. Thus, from a
purely economic perspective, the deterrent value derived from a threat
of litigation should be less than or equal to the avoidable cost of
litigation (i.e. the expected liability plus the cost of defending the suit).
In theory, class certification increases deterrence by sweeping a
large group of claimants into a single action and increasing the threat of
liability. The magnitude of the increase in deterrence depends upon the
likelihood that individual litigation will be filed if a class is not certified.
For example, a victim of wrongful conduct will have an incentive to file
an individual suit when the expected recovery exceeds the cost of the
litigation. This type of claim, commonly referred to as a positive value
claim, creates a threat of liability from individual litigation which in turn
induces an actor to invest in precautions. When there are many similar
positive value claims, an actor will anticipate a threat of liability from a
series of individual suits and invest in precautions up to the value of the
aggregate expected loss. 13 Certification of a class of positive value
claims enhances deterrence only to the extent that the class sweeps the
entire group of similar claims into a single suit, including those claims
option of investing $50 annually in brake maintenance to reduce future
accident costs. A will invest in the precaution as long as the reduction in annual
accident costs exceeds $50. B will not invest in the precaution because the cost
of the precaution is greater than his annual accident costs. Even if the
investment in precaution would reduce his annual accident costs to zero, B
would be investing $25 more in precautions than he would reap in benefit. The
Costs of Accidents, supra note 8, at 74.
11
The expected loss is the product of the magnitude of expected harm
multiplied by the probability of harm.
12
The probability that the defendant will be liable for the harm is
distinguishable from the probability of harm itself. The probability of harm
depends upon the likelihood that events will unfold in a certain way, whereas
the probability of liability depends upon whether the plaintiff will satisfy the
burden of proof on each of the elements of the claim.
13
The aggregate expected loss depends in part upon the likelihood that
individual suits will actually be filed. As the expected net benefit decreases
toward zero, the likelihood that an individual suit will be filed also decreases.
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that might not actually be filed as individual suits.14 Thus, positive value
class actions enhance deterrence in an amount equal to the delta
between the threat of loss from a class action and the threat of loss
from a series of individual suits. 15
Certification of a class of negative value claims presents a very
different situation. A victim of wrongful conduct will have no economic
incentive to file an individual suit when the expected recovery is
dwarfed by the cost of pursuing the litigation. Thus, there is no threat
of individual litigation and an actor has no economic incentive to invest
in precautions. Certification of a class of negative value claims,
however, enables litigation of the claims and creates a threat of liability
that would not otherwise exist.
The following formula represents the deterrent value derived
from a class action seeking damages:
ELCA * pCA + ECCA ≥ ICA
Where ELCA represents the expected aggregate loss to the class; pCA
represents the probability that the actor will be liable for the harm
caused to the class; ECCA represents the expected cost of defending
against the class action; and ICA represents the investment in
precautions to avoid harm to the class.
While these formulas are useful in conceptualizing deterrence,
they camouflage several potential limitations of deterrence theory.
14

Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 904
(“Type-A class actions, or ’Positive value’ class actions, include those class
actions where individual claims are sufficiently large so that ‘each claim would
be independently marketable even in the absence of the class action device.”)
Positive value class actions tend to be disfavored by courts because class action
treatment is considered unnecessary when individual suits are feasible. See,
e.g. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Castano v.
th
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5 Cir. 1996). Restrictions on positive
value class actions have encouraged the use of non-class aggregation
techniques that involve the use of pre-trial multi-district consolidation, unified
judicial management, and collective settlement agreements. See Troy A.
McKenzie, Toward A Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 962 (2012). A number of scholars have raised warning
flags about the growing use of non-class aggregation because the lack of class
certification requirements that protect individual claimants allows for the over
empowerment of lawyers. Id. at 962-63. See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Financiers as Monitors: Unbundling Agency, Risk, and Rewards in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1273, 1274-76 (2012).
15
The magnitude of this delta depends upon a variety of factors including the
likelihood that individual suits will be filed, the likelihood of success by plaintiffs
in the individual suits, the likelihood that a class will be certified, and the
likelihood of success by the class.

5
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First, the formulas assume an actor has access to perfect information.
In fact, however, estimating the relevant variables, at the relevant time,
may be very difficult. 16 Second, the formulas assume that the
underlying harm may be remediated by a change in conduct motivated
by cost incentives. Some harm, however, may be undeterred by cost
incentives. 17 Finally, the formulas assume that an actor faces a choice
between an act and its accident costs. Yet, when an actor invests in
insurance to protect against the risk of accident costs, the insurer pools
together a variety of risks and spreads the loss among them. Grouping
risks together potentially dilutes the incentive to avoid harm because a
specific act no longer bears its own costs. 18
A simple accident example illustrates these limitations. Assume
a driver is approaching a yellow light. If the driver knows that running
the light will increase accident costs by $100 19 and stopping at the light
will have no impact on accident costs, one would assume that the driver
will be more likely to stop at the light than run through it. 20 Yet, at the
time that the decision is made, it is very unlikely that the driver will be
able to make an accurate and timely estimate of the costs and benefits
of his conduct. 21 Moreover, if the driver is daydreaming as he
approaches the yellow light, he will not have control over his conduct
and the incentives will fail to deter the harm. If the driver has
purchased accident insurance and agreed to pay an annual premium in
exchange for protection from lump sum accident costs, he is less likely
to change his behavior as he approaches the yellow light than if he
didn’t have insurance because the connection between his conduct at
the time of the accident and the resulting accident cost is diluted by the
insurance company’s ability to spread the loss among a pool of risks. 22
16

Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 838, n. 19 (the expected value of a claim
depends upon a number of factors, including litigation costs and risks, the types
and difficulty of proof, the complexity of factual, legal, and related public policy
questions, and the novelty of the issues involved); The Costs of Accidents,
supra note 8, at 103 (noting that individuals are unlikely to be able to estimate
accurately the risk before an accident occurs); see also, Bruce Hay, David
Rosenberg, Sweetheart and Blackmail Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1377, 1394-97(2000) (noting that courts
have trouble estimating the size of a class and the expected recovery even after
the underlying events have unfolded).
17
The Costs of Accidents, supra note 8, 110 (general deterrence is not effective
in stopping people from absentmindedly taking their eyes off the road).
18
Id. at 103-04.
19
The increase in accident costs is calculated by multiplying the increased
probability of harm by the magnitude of the harm.
20
The decision would also have to take into account the expected benefit from
running the light, if any.
21
Id. at 103.
22
Id. at 104. Even if the driver knows that his rates are likely to increase if he
causes an accident, the monetary value of the premium increase is not equal to

6
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Although deterrence theory would suggest that the driver should stop
at the yellow light to avoid the increase in accident costs, the theory
fails to account for the real life variables that may cause the driver to
run the light notwithstanding the increase in accident costs that may be
incurred.
To analyze the how actual decision making varies from rational
forecasts, the next section discusses a series of empirical studies that
test the deterrence assumption in a variety of procedural and
substantive contexts. Although the data collected in these studies helps
to inform our understanding of deterrence theory, these studies leave
many questions unanswered.
II. Recent Studies on Deterrence Theory
Studies seeking to test the efficacy of deterrence theory have
reached mixed conclusions. 23 While some studies have found a link
between cost internalization and deterrence, 24 no study to date has
the monetary value associated with the lump sum accident cost that he would
incur if he did not have insurance. Id.
23
See e.g., Tom R. Tyle & John M. Darley, Building A Law-Abiding Society:
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into
Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 713
(2000) (“Although research supports the basic premise of the deterrence
model, it also suggests that estimates of the likelihood of being caught and
punished have, at best, a minor influence on people’s law-related behavior.
Some studies suggest that such estimates do not independently influence
behavior when the influence of other factors is considered. Other studies find
an independent influence, but it is typically small in magnitude.”); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL L. REV. 1051, 1056
(2000) (“The use of rational choice theory enabled the law-and-economics
movement, in its early days, to achieve significant advances in understanding
the interaction between legal rules and society. But now that the movement
has reached intellectual maturity, the rationality assumption severely limits its
continued scholarly development. There is simply too much credible
experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are
incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory.”); Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377, 379 (1994) (comparing the “strong” form of the
deterrence argument – which assumes that tort law does in fact deter as
thoroughly as economic models suggest – and a more “moderate” form of the
argument – which assumes that tort law provides some amount of deterrence,
but considerably less than the economists tend to predict. Author concludes
that the strong form of the deterrence argument is unsound.)
24
Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks
133 (1990) (workers’ compensation systems result in a decrease in worker
fatalities); Frank A. Sloan, Emily M. Stout, Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein & Lan
Liang, Drinkers, Drivers and Bartenders: Balancing Private Choices and Public

7
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been able to substantiate the assumption that the imposition of
damages serves as a comprehensive deterrent. 25 Indeed, one study
found no clear link between the threat of punitive damages and
deterrence, 26 another study found only “thin” evidence of a correlation
between liability for medical malpractice and a reduction in negligence
rates, 27 and several studies reached mixed results on the deterrent
effects of tort reform. 28
Two recent studies illustrate the inconsistency of the evidence
on deterrence theory. In a study published in 2012, Professors Cardi,
Penfield and Yoon surveyed over 700 first-year law students and
presented them with a series of vignettes involving conduct that might
result in liability. 29 The students were given a prompt regarding the
applicable law and asked to rate the likelihood that they would engage
in the conduct. The prompts described the consequences of the
conduct under the applicable law in one of four ways: (1) no liability; (2)
criminal liability; 30 (3) tort liability; or (4) no mention of the applicable

Accountability (2000) (liability on alcohol servers reduces fatalities from alcohol
related motor vehicle accidents).
25
Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 5 (“Some scholars have found limited evidence
that tort acts as a weak deterrent with respect to certain behaviors. Still others
have found no evidence of deterrence or even, in a few cases, a negative
association – that certain tort rules are associated with an increase in related
injuries.”)
26
W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L. J. 285, 296-98 (1998).
27
Michelle M. Mello, Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1595, 1598 (2002).
28
See Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shephard, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths,
50 J. L. & Econ. 221 (2007) (finding some tort reforms associated with fewer
motor vehicle accidental deaths); Joanna Shephard, Tort Reforms’ Winners and
Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
905, 905 (2008) (finding tort reforms in medical malpractice area correlate with
an increase in deaths).
29
Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 5 (the vignettes included: (1) throwing a metal
Frisbee with thinner than average edges in a public park; (2) allowing someone
to ride your wave-runner without a life jacket; (3) using a cell phone while
driving; (4) an off-duty EMT driving by an injured motorcyclist; (5) bumping a
parked car to get out of a parking space; (6) a train conductor on a runaway
train deciding whether to switch the track which will result in killing one person
or doing nothing which will result in killing several people; (7) throwing a metal
boomerang with thinner than average edges in a public park; (8) operating
heavy machinery while medicated; (9) providing a recommendation for a
former employee who often showed up late for work.)
30
Id. at 12 (although the use of the word “criminal” in this situation may not be
technically accurate, the authors sought to capture the moral dimension that
society associates with criminal versus civil responsibility).

8
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law at all. 31 Interestingly, the results of the study found that “the threat
of tort liability had little to no deterrent effect” on the likelihood that
participants would engage in the specified conduct. 32 Surprisingly, the
study participants were just as likely to take risks when they were told
that they might be subject to tort liability as when they were told that
they would be subject to no liability. 33
Several possible explanations of the study results may be
available. Study participants may have underestimated the risk of
incurring tort sanctions, either as a result of cognitive bias or because of
a perception that only a small percentage of tortious injuries result in
the filing of a civil action. 34 Moreover, to the extent that legal liability is
imposed for breaches of social norms and shared community values, it
is possible that tort sanctions had little effect on willingness to engage
in risky conduct because the study participants were already inclined to
abide by existing social standards of conduct. 35 Finally, participants may
have assumed that insurance would cover the liability, thus reducing the
deterrent effect of the threat of liability. 36
31

Id. (providing no legal regime was intended to measure whether people
consciously consider the possibility of legal sanctions when acting in a way that
creates risk).
32
Id. at 21 (the threat of criminal liability, on the other hand, correlated with
deterrence).
33
Id. at 24 (The authors note that “[t]his finding is counterintuitive. It
contradicts not only the study’s hypothesis, but also decades-old contrary
assumptions of judges, policy-makers, and academics. Moreover, the finding
even belies self-reports of the study’s participants. [Participating students]
reported (after having participated in the study) that they had expected to be
proven less likely to engage in risky behavior in the face of potential tort
liability than in its absence. The study’s results … reveal this intuition to be
inaccurate.”)
34
Id. at 26, citing Ruther Ruttenberg, W. Jonathan Cardi, Estye Ross, The
Taxpayer’s Burden from Product-Related Injuries 24-27 (March 1, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (estimating that an annual average of over
131,000,000 product related injuries results in only 24-29,000 product liability
suits filed). See also, Daniel Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law,
42 Kan. L. Rev. 115, 121 (1993) (a deterrent effect is achieved when certainty of
punishment reaches a sufficient level); Joyce Ehrlinger & David Dunning, How
Chronic Self-Views Influence (and Potentially Mislead) Estimates of
Performance, 84 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 5, 5-7 (2003) (people tend to
overestimate their own abilities and to underestimate their chances of
becoming injured or of injuring others); Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulations, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 706 (1999)
(describing a cognitive bias that suggests people are more likely to see an event
as foreseeable if they recall similar events having occurred in the past).
35
Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 26.
36
Id. at 28. To the extent that at least some of the vignettes involved conduct
that is not likely to be the subject of liability insurance (i.e., throwing a Frisbee),
however, it is unlikely that this particular explanation is relevant to the
conclusions of the study.

9
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In light of these results, it is surprising that another 2012 study
concluded that a threat of damages promotes socially desirable
behavior, particularly when damages relate to a class of victims or
exceed actual harm. 37 In this study, Professors Eisenberg and Engel
tested the deterrent value of damages liability in three situations: (1)
damages to an individual litigant; (2) damages to a class of litigants; and
(3) damages beyond actual harm to victims, such as through a punitive
damages regime. 38 Employing a public good experiment design, 39 the
study sought to determine if the risk of liability in any of the three
scenarios would cause participants to maintain a stable rate of
cooperation toward a public good over time. 40
37

Theodore Eisenberg, Christoph Engel, Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort:
A Public Good Experiment, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041154.
38
Id. at 3.
39
Id. at 5. A public good experiment provides participants with an endowment
from which each participant may choose to make a contribution to the public
good. The experiment is designed so that the group obtains a maximum
benefit if all participants contribute 100% of their endowment to the public
good but each individual obtains the most individual benefit by not
contributing at all. The experiment is repeated many times to determine if
contributions change in response to earlier experience. Id.
40
The experiment lasted 30 periods and each period was divided into two
stages. Id. at 8. In the first stage, each individual participant was given an
endowment of 20 experimental currency units (ECUs) and had to decide how
much of it to contribute to a public good project and how much to keep. Each
participant’s income was determined by subtracting the participant’s
contribution from the original endowment and adding a percentage of the total
contributions made by all participants. Participants were informed about the
other participants’ contributions after individual contributions were complete.
Each participant’s income was determined according to the following formula:
Income = endowment – individual contribution + 40% (total contributions)
If all participants contributed all of their endowment, total social welfare would
be maximized and each participant’s income would be equal (20 – 20 + 40% of
total contributions). If one participant contributed zero, however, and the
remaining participants contributed all of their endowments, the participant
who contributed nothing would freeload off the benefits conferred by the
public good without paying for it (20 – 0 + 40% of the total contributions)
whereas the participants who contributed would earn less (20 – 20 + 40% of
the total contributions).
In the second stage, one participant was randomly chosen as the
“active participant.” The active participant was allowed to take ECUs from
other participants based upon how much each of the other participants
invested in the public good project in the first stage. The amount of ECUs that
the active participant could take from other participants sought to replicate
damages in three scenarios: actual harm to an individual plaintiff, actual harm
to a class of plaintiffs, and damages exceeding actual harm (i.e., punitive

10
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The results of the experiment support the conclusion that
cooperation toward a public good project improves more when actors
are threatened with aggregate damages for the total harm caused to a
group than when they are threatened with damages for individual
harm. The baseline of the experiment supported the expected
conclusion that cooperation toward a common goal deteriorates when
there is no opportunity to seek damages from a freeloading party. 41 A
decline in cooperation persisted in the model that allowed the active
participant to seek damages for his own injury, but the decline was less
severe than when no damages were available at all. 42 When the active
participant was able to seek aggregate damages for the harm caused to
the entire group, cooperation remained virtually stable at a higher level
than both of the other two models (the baseline and individual
compensatory models), at least by the later periods of the experiment. 43
The final treatment allowed the imposition of damages that exceeded
the overall harm caused to the entire group, thus resembling a punitive
damages regime. Unlike all of the earlier treatments, this scenario
resulted in increased cooperation over time. 44 Overall the authors
found evidence suggesting:

damages). Id. at 9. The first scenario sought to replicate traditional bipolar
litigation by allowing the active player to impose damages for harm caused to
the active player – measured by the “difference between what the active
player received and what she would have received in the period if the punished
players had contributed as much to the project as the active player did.” Id.
The second scenario sought to replicate class action litigation by allowing the
active player to impose damages for the total harm the punished player caused
to the group. The third scenario allowed the active player to impose damages
up to the punished player’s income in the period, regardless of the actual harm
caused to the active player or the group. Id. at 9-12.
41
Id. at 15.
42
Id. at 16. (“Overall the compensatory treatment somewhat improves the
public good compared to the baseline but the effect is not strong enough to
avoid the common deterioration in cooperation over time.”)
43
Id. at 20-21 (“The increased damages available in the class action treatment
stem the classic … trend of deteriorating cooperation over time. Holding the
low-contributor liable for a greater share of the harm they impose leads to
improved behavior from the perspective of social welfare.”) The class action
treatment found a strong association between prior period punishment and
contribution levels: “In the last ten periods, contributions increased by an
average of 2.7 ECUs when the participant had been required to pay damages in
the prior period … and decreased by an average of 0.9 ECUs when the
participant did not pay damages [in the prior period].” Id. at 22. This finding
suggests that participants learned from prior experience and were willing to
adjust their behavior in light of previous liability.
44
Id. at 23, 27-29. (The punitive treatment raises concerns about the possibility
of antisocial punishment imposed by the active player. When the concern
regarding antisocial punishment is removed, the results of the punitive
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a damages rule analogous to [traditional bilateral
litigation] is sufficient to deter serious deterioration in
cooperation over time…. A damages rule more closely
tied to … damages in class action litigation, prevented
the pattern of deteriorating cooperation over time. A
more Draconian rule of damages, linked to income
without requiring harm, promoted increased
cooperation over time but at the cost of allowing
socially unjust damages. 45
Although both of these recent studies were comprehensively
planned and meticulously executed, they reach conflicting conclusions
that suggest further research is necessary. By analyzing what the
evidence in these studies shows, and fails to show, these studies point
the way for further study.
Both of the recent studies analyze reported behavior, rather
than actual behavior. 46 The studies seek to predict how actors will
respond to a threat of liability based upon hypothetical factual
scenarios. The nature of a hypothetical scenario raises the possibility
that participants may incorrectly report how they would actually behave
under similar circumstances. Indeed, by focusing the participants’
attention on isolated, hypothetical situations, the reported behavior is
based upon a more simplified decision making process than actual
behavior would be. 47 Since it is impossible to measure how reported
behavior varies from actual behavior, further research should focus on
collecting data based upon actual historical behavior.
treatment show non-deterioration in cooperation over time but no clear
increase in cooperation over time).
45
Id. at 35.
46
Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 28. (The authors recognize that reliance on
reported behavior rather than actual behavior is a weakness of the study, but
they suggest that the data “would, if at all, bias the findings in favor of finding a
deterrent effect of tort…. Studies have shown that survey participants tend to
over-report behaviors they deem to be socially acceptable and under-report
those deemed to be unacceptable.”)
47
Christine Jolls, Cass. R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1477-79 (1998). (Studies have shown
that actual judgments often differ from forecasts because of limited cognitive
abilities by decision makers. “Bounded rationality … refers to the obvious fact
that human cognitive abilities are not infinite…. To deal with limited memories
we make lists. To deal with limited brain power and time we use mental
shortcuts and rules of thumb. But even with these remedies, and in some
cases because of these remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways
from that predicted by the standard economic model of unbounded rationality.
Even when the use of mental shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable
mistakes.”)

12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331676

[Vol. xxx]

Law Review

2013

The recent studies also provide vastly different opportunities
for participants to learn from previous experience. The first study
provides data on a single-period experiment and finds little or no
deterrent effect from the threat of damages. By limiting the experiment
to a single period, however, the study fails to provide data regarding an
actor’s behavioral revisions in light of previous experience. The second
study, on the other hand, provides participants an opportunity to revise
their behavior in 30 immediate periods of repeated play. Notably, levels
of cooperation were quite different after 10 periods, 20 periods and 30
periods of play, suggesting that behavior evolved over time as
experience was reinforced again and again. While each of these studies
presents very different opportunities to learn from experience, it is
unclear how closely these hypothetical scenarios resemble actual
decision making. Data based upon actual experience would close the
gap.
Both studies simplify the problem of informational
deficiencies. 48 In order to predict a threat of liability, a corporation must
estimate and then aggregate liability on individual claims. 49 These
estimates are subject to variability. 50 Indeed, potential liability tends to
change throughout the lifecycle of a lawsuit. For example, the expected
loss from litigation at any particular point in time increases or decreases
depending upon how a court rules on pivotal motions, such as a motion
to dismiss for failure to state claim, class certification, admissibility of
expert testimony, or summary judgment. 51 Reported behavior based
upon hypothetical scenarios fails to account for these challenges.
Finally, both studies measure individual behavior rather than
institutional behavior. To the extent that decision making processes are

48

Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 34.
George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence,
Compensation, and Necessity, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1989, 1994 (2002). (“All of the
plausible means for determining overall liability require first an approximation
and then a summation of liability on individual claims. No mass tort case seems
to come with a figure for total liability attached.”)
50
For example, estimates are subject to variability depending upon risk
preferences. Studies involving cognitive psychology have shown that individuals
tend to be risk averse with respect to moderate to high probability gains
(plaintiffs with strong cases) but risk seeking with respect to moderate to high
probability losses (defendants with weak cases). On the other hand, studies
also show that individuals generally tend to be risk seeking as to low probability
gains (plaintiffs with weak cases) and risk averse as to low probability losses
(defendants with strong cases). Richard Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again?
Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DePaul Law Review 647, 657-58 (2011)
51
Nagareda, supra note 49, at 649.
49
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different for individuals and corporations, 52 data based upon individual
behavior may not accurately predict institutional behavior.
The next section describes a new study designed to advance our
understanding of deterrence and negative value class actions by
focusing on actual historical experience with negative value class action
litigation from the perspective of corporate decision makers.
III.
Deterrence: A View of From Within the Fortune 500
a. Study Goals
The goal of this study is to refine our understanding of the
relationship between negative value class action litigation and the
prevention of harm. Toward this end, a comprehensive Questionnaire
was sent to general counsel at each of the corporations on the 2011
Fortune 500 list. 53 Unlike previous studies that rely upon randomly
chosen study participants to report how they would respond to
hypothetical situations, this study collects data from those individuals
who are most likely to possess institutional knowledge regarding
negative value class action litigation. 54 In this sense, the study fills an
important gap left open by previous studies. 55
The efficacy of deterrence theory depends upon the likelihood
that an actor will predict a risk of future liability at a time when
precautions may be taken to avoid the liability. As illustrated by the
deterrence formula, a number of variables play into the decision to
invest in precautions to avoid future harm. 56 Indeed, accurately
predicting the variables that inform the left side of the equation – the
avoidable cost of litigation – depends upon predicting the likelihood and
52

Cardi, et al., supra note 8, at 29 (“Prior research has hinted that the threat of
tort sanctions might have a greater deterrent effect on firms”).
53
Questionnaire, Appendix A.
54
The survey was sent to general counsels on the assumption that they are
most likely to possess institutional knowledge of how the companies have
responded to the threat of class action litigation. To the extent that this
assumption was inaccurate, survey recipients were requested to forward the
survey to a person who possessed such knowledge.
55
For example, in the previous studies based upon hypothetical scenarios, it
was impossible to determine how informational deficiencies, risk preferences
and cognitive limitations might change the reported behavior of participants.
By relying upon actual historical experience, decision makers have incorporated
any relevant practical limitations and made the best decision possible in light of
these challenges.
56
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
deterrence formula: EL * p + EC ≥ I.
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magnitude of harm that may result from particular conduct (EL), as well
as the legal implications that flow from the harm (p). Several decades
ago, Professor Francis McGovern popularized the concept of maturity in
relation to class action litigation. 57 He suggested that litigation is
mature when “little or no new evidence will be developed, significant
appellate review of any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at
least one full cycle of trial strategies has been exhausted.” 58 Prior to
maturity, evidence is still being developed, legal issues are yet to be
resolved and trial strategies are uncertain. In light of the fact that
deterrence depends heavily upon the ability to anticipate future
liability, this study seeks to better understand the relationship between
litigation maturity and deterrence. 59
Intuitively, one would presume that prior litigation provides a
valuable source of information from which a corporation may predict
future liability. For example, a corporation that has been held liable for
harm resulting from particular conduct in the past, will possess
information regarding the factual and legal assertions that formed the
basis for liability in the previous litigation, and this information is
available to inform a prediction about the risk of future liability for
similar conduct. Indeed, once a corporation is held liable for particular
conduct, one would expect the corporation to take affirmative action to
avoid incurring future litigation regarding the same or similar conduct.
Even when a corporation has not been a party to previous
litigation, the imposition of liability against others can form the basis for
predicting future liability. For example, a corporation that is aware of
previous litigation against a competitor will be equipped to anticipate a
risk of future liability for similar conduct. Indeed, if a corporation
possesses information about the factual and legal assertions that
formed the basis for the imposition of liability against a competitor, one
would expect the corporation to take affirmative steps to avoid
incurring future litigation regarding the same or similar conduct.
When there is no track record from previous litigation,
predicting future liability is much more difficult. One would expect that
cases involving novel legal theories and/or unproven factual scenarios
are hard to predict precisely because there is little or no information to
put a corporation on notice of the factual and legal assertions that may
form the basis for liability.

57

Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
659, 659 (1989)(describing mature mass torts as those involving “full and
complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in plaintiffs’
contentions. ”).
58
Id.
59
Id.
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The study presented in this paper seeks to test these
assumptions. The Questionnaire includes three basic parts: a statement
of the study goal; 60 a definition section; 61 and thirty-two questions. The
questions seek to collect data to prove (or disprove) the following three
hypotheses:
1.

A risk of future liability is easier to anticipate when there is a
well-developed record of the factual and legal issues from
previous litigation than when there is no track record from
previous litigation;

2. Corporations who have been held liable for particular conduct
will successfully change their conduct to avoid future litigation
regarding similar conduct;
3. Corporations who are informed about lawsuits filed against
their competitors and who rely upon this information in making
their own business decisions will successfully change their
conduct to avoid subsequent similar litigation.
60

The survey states that the “goal of the study is to refine our understanding
of the relationship between small-stakes class action litigation and the
prevention of injury.” A judgment was made to use the phrase “small-stakes”
class action in the Questionnaire rather than the phrase “negative value” class
action. The phrases are synonymous.
61
To ensure that all Respondents share similar understanding of the
terminology, the Questionnaire included the following definitions:
“Small-Stakes Class Actions” join together claims that cannot be economically
litigated on an individual basis because each claim for relief is insufficient to
cover the costs of litigation. Individual claims may seek damages ranging from a
few pennies to several thousand dollars. Once joined together into a class,
these claims become viable because the cost of litigation is spread among a
large group of class members. [The phrase small-stakes class action is
synonymous with negative value class action.]
“First Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions
that involve novel legal theories and/or unproven factual scenarios.
[hereinafter referred to as First Generation Action]
“Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions
that involve legal theories and factual scenarios that have been previously
argued in other cases but have not been definitively resolved. Thus while the
case theories are not novel, ambiguity exists regarding the interpretation of
important legal questions and/or the existence of evidentiary support for
factual allegations. [hereinafter referred to as Second Generation Action].
“Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions
that involve legal theories and factual scenarios that have been the subject of
earlier class actions and enjoy fairly well developed legal and factual support
from previous litigation. While some level of ambiguity persists, third
generation class actions enjoy the most robust information from which to
predict the likely outcome of a suit. [hereinafter referred to as Third
Generation Action]. See Questionnaire, Appendix A, at page 1.
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b. Reducing Survey Error
The study is structured to reduce the potential for survey error.
Survey error may arise from a variety of sources, including coverage
error, sampling error, measurement error, and nonresponse error.
Coverage error occurs when the list from which a sample is drawn fails
to include all elements of a population, thus skewing the survey by
failing to give all elements of the population a chance at participation. 62
To reduce coverage error, the Questionnaire was sent to every company
on the 2011 Fortune 500 list. This gave every member of the list an
equal chance to participate, and reduced the potential for coverage
error. The list of Fortune 500 companies was obtained from public
records, corporate counsels were identified from company websites,
and all non-respondents were contacted via multiple means (i.e.
multiple mailings and personal telephone calls). Finally, all packages
returned to sender were checked, corrected and re-mailed. The overall
risk of coverage error, therefore, is quite small.
Although the Questionnaire was sent to the entire population of
Fortune 500 companies, responses were not received from every
recipient of the survey. Thus, the study seeks to rely upon the sample
of responses received to generalize results of the Questionnaire to the
entire survey population. Sampling error arises whenever data is
collected from a subset of the relevant population and is used to
estimate the distribution of characteristics of the entire population. 63
While it is impossible to remove this potential for error without
collecting data from every member of a population, it is possible to
estimate sampling error with considerable precision. 64 Thus, when
estimating the characteristics of the population from the random
sample of survey responses, sample results are accompanied by a 95%
confidence interval which suggests that 95 out of 100 times a random
sample is drawn from the population, the estimate from that sample
will be within a specific range of the sample results. For example, if the
results of a sample show that 20% of the respondents answered a
particular question in the affirmative, a 95% confidence interval of +/5% would mean that 95 out of 100 times a random sample is drawn
from the same population, 15-25% of the respondents will answer the
same question in the affirmative. 65

62

Don A. Dillman, Jolene D. Smyth, Leah Melani Christian, Internet, Mail and
Mixed-Mode Surveys: The Tailored Design Method 17, 43 (Third ed. 2009).
63
Id. (“[S]ampling error results from surveying only some rather than all
members of the population and exists as a part of all sample surveys”).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 56-57.
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Measurement error results from ambiguous questions that
create imprecise responses. 66 To reduce the risk of measurement error,
the Questionnaire includes a variety of question and response formats.
A number of questions employ a polar-point-labeled scale response
system with verbally and numerically labeled end points and
numerically labeled mid points, equally spaced along a horizontal
continuum (the numerical scale ranges from 1-10). This question type
provides an easy method for Respondents to conceptualize relative
preferences. 67 Other questions provide a full set of verbal category
labels, equally spaced in a vertical list. This type of response system
offers more control over how each response is interpreted. 68 Some
questions ask for a yes or no response. To the extent that any questions
resulted in ambiguous responses, they have been omitted from the
study conclusions.
Nonresponse error occurs when those “who do not respond are
different from those who do respond in a way that is important to the
study.” 69 Since the goal of the study is to analyze how corporations
respond to the threat of negative value class action litigation, it is
imperative that those who respond to the survey share a similar
vulnerability to this type of litigation as those who do not respond. 70 In
other words, the sample must represent both the characteristics shared
by the population and the diversity of characteristics that differentiate
the members of the population in relation to the subject of the study.
Although the population consists of a diverse group of companies
operating in a wide variety of industries, every member of the
population is a publicly traded company that is subject to state and
federal securities regulation. As such, every member of the population
shares a similar vulnerability to securities class action litigation. Given
that securities litigation is by far the single most common type of class
action, this similarity among the population reduces the risk of

66

Id. at 18.
Id. at 143 (Some surveyors prefer this response system over a full set of
verbal category labels because they believe that a numeric range may provide
an easier method for some respondents to conceptualize relative preferences.
A potential limitation of this method, however, is that the mid points on the
scale are unlabeled and open to respondents’ interpretation.)
68
Id.
69
Id. at 17.
70
This does not mean that data can only be collected from Respondents who
have been named as defendants in such suits. Indeed, a lack of experience as a
litigant may prove that a Respondent is particularly well versed at recognizing
the threat of litigation and averting the harm. Such a Respondent would
provide highly relevant information for this study. Rather, data must be
collected from a sample that shares similar exposure to negative value class
action litigation as the entire population.
67
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nonresponse error significantly. 71 Indeed, to the extent that these class
actions often involve negative value claims, exposure to this type of
litigation is directly relevant to the subject of the study. In addition to
potential securities class actions, members of the population may share
similar vulnerability to employment related class actions, including civil
rights, ERISA and other labor suits. 72 Of course, vulnerability to class
action litigation is not completely uniform across the population
because some industry specific class action suits are not equally
prevalent for all members of the population. For example, companies in
71

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that as of 2004,
47% of class actions pending in federal court involved securities
regulation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:

Reforming the Securities Class action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1539-40 (2006)(securities class
actions are “the 800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other
forms of class actions”). The following table shows class actions pending in
federal courts as of September 30, 2002, 2003,and 2004:

Type of Case

2002

2003

2004

Contract

282

290

289

Real Property

33

38

34

Tort Actions

529

604

600

Antitrust

249

231

202

Employment Rights

164

159

173

Other Civil Rights

298

274

266

Prisons, Prisoners

66

64

82

RICO

53

76

46

ERISA

134

183

216

Other Labor Suits

180

204

262

Securities/Commodities/Exchange

2325

2339

2480

Others

522

515

529

Total

4835

4977

5179

Securities Class Actions as a Percentage of Total

47.5%

47%

47.9%

See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts 395-97 tbl.X-4 (2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/x04sep02.pdf; Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 393-97 tbl.X-4
(2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendices/x4.pdf;
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts
400-03 tbl.X-4 (2004), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x4.pdf. Since 2004, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts has not provided this data in the annual reports.
72
See id. for the frequency of each of these categories.
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the retail industry are vulnerable to consumer class actions that
companies in the oil pipeline industry likely are not. Overall, the
similarity of exposure to securities and employment related class action
litigation tends to reduce the risk of nonresponse error, while the
relatively small risk of industry specific class action litigation minimally
increases the risk of nonresponse error. As such, efforts were taken to
motivate survey recipients from different industries to respond. 73
A number of techniques were used to motivate a variety of
survey recipients to respond to the Questionnaire. Each mailing
included a personally addressed cover letter that described the
significance of the study, 74as well as a copy of the Questionnaire, a
biography of the author and a self-addressed return envelope.
Approximately eight weeks after the first mailing, a follow up letter was
sent to anyone from whom a response was not yet received (either a
completed survey or correspondence indicating a lack of interest) along
with another copy of the Questionnaire.75 Approximately one to two
weeks following the second mailing, a personal phone call was made to
every recipient from whom a response had not yet been received.
These efforts were successful to a large degree. Specifically, responses
were received from 49 Respondents who participate in 31 different
industries. 76 Nineteen of these industries were represented by a single
Respondent, seven of these industries were represented by two
Respondents, four of these industries were represented by three
Respondents, and one industry was represented by four Respondents. 77

73

Dillman, supra note 62, at 17.
Cover Letter, Appendix B. The cover letter ensured complete confidentiality,
offered to share the results of the study with all survey participants and
provided a telephone number and email address for correspondence with the
author of the study.
75
Follow-up Letter, Appendix C.
76
Responses were received from companies in the following industries:
metals; education; communication equipment; medical products;
pharmaceuticals; construction and farm machines; insurance: life and health;
insurance property and casualty; engineering and construction; health care:
medical facilities; information technology services; motor vehicle and parts;
telecommunications; food: consumer products; food: wholesale; general
merchandise; specialty retailer; industrial machinery; utility: gas and electric;
chemicals; pipelines; electronic equipment; aerospace and defense;
automotive retailing services; mining, crude oil products; financial data
services; computer services; scientific, photographic and control equipment;
entertainment; commercial bank; internet services; and retailing.
77
The following industries had multiple Respondents: communication
equipment (2 Respondents); construction and farm machines (2 Respondents);
insurance: life and health (3 Respondents); motor vehicles and parts (2
Respondents); food: consumer products (3 Respondents); general merchandise
(2 Respondents); specialty retailer (2 Respondents); utility: gas and electric (4
Respondents); chemicals (2 Respondents); electronic equipment (3
74
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Overall, Respondents represent a diverse group of publicly traded
companies that share a vulnerability to class action litigation involving
state or federal securities claims, civil rights claims, ERISA claims, and
other labor related claims, and may also share exposure to class action
litigation involving industry specific claims.
Notwithstanding these efforts, some survey error likely remains.
Although each corporate counsel had an equal opportunity to
participate in the study, the sensitive nature of the subject matter likely
discouraged many from participating. While the data collected provides
adequate coverage of the population to draw conclusions within a 95%
confidence interval for most questions, a higher participation rate
would have allowed narrower confidence intervals.
Moreover, those who responded to the survey may have more
experience with class action litigation and/or have a stronger opinion
regarding the subject of the study than those recipients who chose not
to participate. 78 Indeed, a small number of survey recipients
communicated a hesitation to participate in the study precisely because
they had little or no experience with class action litigation and therefore
thought they had nothing of value to add. 79
Finally, to the extent that all Respondents are vulnerable to
class action suits, they have an incentive to downplay the validity of this
costly regulatory device. While it is impossible to ignore this reality, the
evidence does not indicate that the results are skewed to any significant
degree by bias. The Respondents do not have similar experience with
negative value class action litigation. Thirteen Respondents from
thirteen different industries responded that they have never been
named as a defendant in a negative value class action, suggesting that
these Respondents are less negatively disposed to the device than a
Respondent who has been dogged by such actions. Indeed, even
among Respondents who have been named as defendants in such
litigation, most Respondents indicate that they tend to be sued in such
actions infrequently. Moreover, one would expect bias to result in
Respondents); aerospace and defense (2 Respondents); automotive retailing
services (3 Respondents).
78
Of the 49 survey responses, 13 Respondents have never been a defendant in
a negative value class action.
79
When these thoughts were communicated, the author explained that the
depth and breadth of exposure to class action litigation (or lack thereof) is, in
and of itself, meaningful evidence that is relevant to the study.
Notwithstanding, it is likely that some recipients of the Questionnaire chose
not to respond for this reason.
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uniform responses. Yet, the responses in this study tend to be spread
out, often covering the entire spectrum from very low to very high.
Overall, the data provides valuable evidence regarding deterrence in
large, publicly traded companies.

c. Survey Results
Hypothesis 1:
A risk of future liability is easier to anticipate when there is a
well-developed record of the factual and legal issues from
previous litigation than when there is no track record from
previous litigation.
In order to estimate future liability, an actor must be able to: (1)
anticipate the legal and factual claims that may form the basis for
liability in the future; (2) estimate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on
the merits; and (3) estimate the magnitude of the potential liability. An
error in any of these estimates will result in under or over deterrence.
The following questions seek to gauge Respondents’ ability to anticipate
the variables that inform deterrence at each stage of litigation
maturity. 80
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a First Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal and
factual claims at the time of the event or business decision that
later became the subject of the class action suit. (emphasis in
original) 81
The response to this question suggests that most Respondents have a
very hard time anticipating the legal and factual claims that form the
basis for First Generation Actions. Indeed, only 10% of Respondents
rate their ability to anticipate these actions as high, 15% rate their
ability to anticipate these actions as moderate, and a full 75% rate their

80

See supra note 61 for the definition of First Generation Small-Stakes Class
Actions, Section Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions, and Third Generation
Small-Stakes Class Actions.
81
The response scale ranges from “1 = We generally have not anticipated the
legal and/or factual claims” to “10 = We generally have anticipated the legal
and factual claims.” See Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 15.
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ability to anticipate these actions as low. 82 One Respondent gave a
rating of “1” with the explanation that “Decisions were made decades
ago and preceded change in laws.”
In light of this data, it is not surprising that Respondents also
have difficulty anticipating plaintiff’s likelihood of success in First
Generation actions. The following question asks:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a First Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to estimate the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success on the merits at the time of the event or
business decision that later became the subject of the suit.
(emphasis in original) 83
In response to this question, 20% of Respondents rate their ability to
estimate plaintiffs’ likelihood of success as high; 25% rate their ability as
moderate; and 55% rate their ability as low. 84 Similarly, Respondents
have trouble estimating the magnitude of potential liability of First
Generation Actions:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a First Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to estimate the magnitude of the
82

Throughout this paper, a rating between 7 – 10 is referred to as “high”, a
rating between 4 – 6 is referred to as “moderate” and a rating between 1 – 3 is
referred to as “low”. Among the 20 Respondents to this question, two rate
their ability to anticipate these actions between 7 – 10; three rate their ability
to anticipate these actions between 4 – 6 (all three rate their ability at 4); and
fifteen rate their ability to anticipate these actions between 1 – 3. A 95%
confidence interval is +/- 13%.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate actions as high, identify with
the following industries: electronic equipment; and utility: gas and electric.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate actions as moderate, identify
with the following industries: construction and farm machines; insurance: life
and health; and commercial bank.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate actions as low, identify with
the following industries: construction and farm machines; insurance: life and
health; insurance: property and casualty; engineering and construction; health
care: medical facilities; food: consumer products; general merchandise;
specialty retailer; utility: gas and electric; automotive retailing services; food:
wholesale; computer services; and entertainment.
83
The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success” to “10 = We have been able to
accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success.” Questionnaire,
Appendix A, question 16.
84
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 13%.
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potential liability at the time of the event or business decision
that later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in original) 85
The response to this question suggests that many Respondents are
unable to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability,
with 20% rating their ability to estimate the magnitude of potential
liability as high, 20% rating their ability as moderate, and a full 60%
rating their ability as low. 86
This data suggests that a large margin of error exists for each of
the relevant variables that inform the deterrence formula for first
generation actions. While it is impossible to determine from this data if
the margin of error on each variable is likely to give rise to under
deterrence or over deterrence, common sense would suggest that
Respondents are more likely to under estimate future liability than over
estimate it.
While it is not surprising that corporations have a hard time
anticipating First Generation Actions, these actions are a necessary
precursor for more mature litigation to develop. Thus, the next series
of questions focuses on Second Generation actions:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Second Generation Small-Stakes
Class Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal and
factual claims at the time of the event or business decision that
later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in original) 87
Not surprisingly, the response to this question suggests that
Respondents are better able to anticipate Second Generation Actions
than First Generation Actions. Indeed, Respondents are almost equally
likely to rate their ability as high, moderate or low, with 31% of
Respondents rating their ability to anticipate such claims as high, 34.5%
rating their ability as moderate, and 34.5% rating their ability as low. 88
85

The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the magnitude of the potential liability” to “10 = We have been able
to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability.” Questionnaire,
Appendix A, question 17.
86
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 13%.
87
Responses are on a scale from “1 = We generally have not anticipated the
legal and/or factual claims” to “10 = We generally have anticipated the legal
and factual claims.” See Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 21.
88
Among the 29 Respondents to this question, nine rate their ability to
anticipate such suits between 7 – 10; ten rate their ability between 4 – 6 and
ten rate their ability between 1 - 3. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 10.5%.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate actions as high, participate in
the following industries: construction and farm machines; telecommunications;
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While it is not surprising that Respondents are more prepared to
anticipate a Second Generation Action than a First Generation Action,
two thirds of Respondents rate their ability to anticipate such claims as
moderate or low, suggesting that optimal deterrence is unlikely to be
achieved in many Second Generation Actions.
A related question asks:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Second Generation Small-Stakes
Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success at the time of the underlying event or
decision that later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in
original) 89
Again, the response to this question suggests that Respondents are
better able to estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in Second
Generation Actions than they are in First Generation Actions, with
34.5% of Respondents rating their ability to estimate the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success as high, 44.8% rating their ability as moderate, and
20.7% rating their ability as low. While these percentages mark an
improvement over First Generation Actions, there is still a considerable
margin of error in predicting future liability.
With regard to estimating the magnitude of the potential
liability, the following question asks:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Second Generation Small-Stakes
Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the magnitude
of the potential liability to the class at the time of the underlying

general merchandise; specialty retailer; utility: gas and electric; chemicals;
electronic equipment; aerospace and defense; and commercial bank.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate these claims as moderate,
participate in the following industries: construction and farm machines;
insurance: life and health; insurance: property and casualty; general
merchandise; chemicals; electronic equipment; automotive retailing services;
computer services; and entertainment.
Respondents who rate their ability to anticipate these claims as low participate
in the following industries: metals; insurance: life and health; motor vehicles
and parts; specialty retailer; utility: gas and electric; automotive retailing
services; food wholesale; scientific photographic and control equipment.
89
The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success” to “10 = We have been able to
accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success.” A 95% confidence
interval is +/- 10.5%. Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 22.
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event or decision that later became the subject of the suit.
(emphasis in original) 90
In response to this question, 41.4% of Respondents rated their ability to
estimate the magnitude of the potential liability as high, while 24.1%
rated their ability as moderate and 34.5% rated their ability as low.
Once litigation is fully mature Respondents rate their ability to
anticipate the risk of legally cognizable harm much higher, evidenced by
the responses to the following question:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Third Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal and
factual claims at the time of the underlying event or decision
that later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in
original) 91
The response to this question shows an overwhelming improvement in
the ability to anticipate the legal and factual claims asserted. A full 75%
of Respondents rate their ability to anticipate Third Generation Actions
as high, with only 12.5% rating their ability as moderate, and 12.5%
rating their ability as low. 92 This is almost the mirror image of
Respondents’ ability to anticipate First Generation Actions where 10%
rate their ability as high, 15% rate their ability as moderate and a full
75% rate their ability as low.
The following related questions resulted in similar responses:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Third Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to estimate the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success at the time of the underlying event or
decision that later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in
original) 93

90

The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the magnitude of the potential liability” to “10 = We have been able
to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability.” A 95%
confidence interval is +/- 10.5%. Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 23
91
The response scale is based upon “1 = We generally have not anticipated the
legal and/or factual claims” to “10 = We generally have anticipated the legal
and factual claims.” See Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 27.
92
Of the 24 Respondents to this question, eighteen rate their ability to
anticipate these claims between 7 – 10. Three rate their ability between 4 – 6,
and three rate their ability between 1 – 3. A 95% confidence interval is +/12%.
93
The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success” to “10 = We have been able to
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Of the 24 responses, 75% rate their ability to estimate plaintiffs’
likelihood of success as high, while 12.5% rate their ability as moderate
and 12.5% rate their ability as low. 94
Finally:
With regard to the occasions when your company has been
named as a defendant in a Third Generation Small-Stakes Class
Action, please rate your ability to estimate the magnitude of the
potential liability at the time of the underlying event or decision
that later became the subject of the suit. (emphasis in original) 95
Here, 75% rate their ability to estimate magnitude of the loss as high,
while 12.5% rate their ability as moderate, and 12.5% rate their ability
as low. 96
Applying this data to the first hypothesis suggests that it is
easier to anticipate a risk of future liability when there is a welldeveloped record of the factual and legal issues from previous litigation
than when there is no track record. Even when litigation is mature,
however, the variables that induce a corporation to engage in
anticipatory compliance are based upon estimates that are subject to
variability. Indeed, 87.5% of Respondents rate their ability to anticipate
even Third Generation actions as 9 or lower, suggesting that most
Respondents perceive some room for error in their estimates. Thus,
while the deterrence formula helps to conceptualize the notion of
anticipatory compliance, it is unlikely that most litigation induces the
precise calculation of deterrence predicted by the formula. 97 This does
not necessarily mean that deterrence is ineffective, however, because a
generalized perception of a risk of liability may be sufficient to induce a
change in conduct. Therefore, deterrence may be more accurately
assessed by how effectively an actor avoids future litigation, a question
that is addressed by the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis #2:
Corporations who have been held liable for particular conduct
will successfully change their conduct to avoid future litigation
regarding similar conduct

accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success.” Questionnaire,
Appendix A, question 28
94
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 12%.
95
The response scale ranges from “1 = We have not been able to accurately
estimate the magnitude of the potential liability” to “10 = We have been able
to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability.” Questionnaire,
Appendix A, question 29.
96
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 12%.
97
See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying test.
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Deterrence theory suggests that if a company is sued in a First
or Second Generation Action, the company will change its conduct to
avoid being sued in a later generation of a suit involving a similar
dispute. The following questions seek to test this premise:
When your company has been named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, approximately
how often has the company been named as a defendant in the
earlier generation of a similar dispute? (emphasis in original) 98
Somewhat surprisingly, 51.7% of Respondents report that they have
been named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute and 48.3% of
Respondents report that they have never been named in an earlier
generation of a similar dispute. 99 The responses to the following
question are even more remarkable:
When your company has been named as a defendant in a Third
Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, approximately how often
has the company been named as a defendant in an earlier
generation of a similar dispute? (emphasis in original) 100
Here, a full 84% report that they have been named in an earlier
generation of a similar dispute and only 16% report that they have
never been named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute. 101 This
data contradicts deterrence theory. Well over three quarters of the
Respondents were unsuccessful in avoiding subsequent litigation, even
after being named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute.

98

Responses include: (a.) Never; (b.) Infrequently (between 1 – 3 times); (c.)
Somewhat often (four or more times). See Questionnaire, Appendix A,
question 20.
99
Based upon 29 responses to this question, fourteen Respondents answered
“Never”, twelve Respondents answered “infrequently (between 1 – 3 times)”
and three Respondents answered “somewhat often (four or more times).” A
95% confidence interval is +/- 16.5%.
100
Responses include: (a.) Never; (b.) Infrequently (between 1 – 3 times); (c.)
Somewhat often (four or more times). Questionnaire, Appendix A, question
26.
101
Based upon 25 responses to this question, seventeen Respondents have
been named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute “infrequently (1 – 3
times)” and four have been named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute
“relatively often (more than 4 times)”. Only four Respondents have never been
named in an earlier generation of a similar dispute. A 95% confidence interval
is +/- 18%.
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Several possible explanations exist. It is possible that
Respondents were unable to change their behavior to avoid the
subsequent suit either because both suits derived from the same
behavior or because the time frame between the suits was short. If this
is the case, Respondents may be unable to respond to the information
learned in the earlier generation suit in time to avoid subsequent
litigation. Even when the time between multiple suits is relatively long,
it is possible that large companies lack the flexibility and nimbleness to
assimilate information, make policy changes, or adapt to new
procedures in time to avoid follow-on litigation. Finally, it is possible
that corporations are in fact changing their behavior to avoid future
litigation but frivolous suits are being filed against them anyway. While
it seems unlikely that frivolous litigation is so rampant that it would
impact 84% of the Respondents, if corporations are in fact making
necessary changes in their conduct to avoid future litigation and they
are being sued nonetheless in frivolous litigation, deterrence is not
working as it should. A change in conduct to avert harm should result in
protection from litigation exposure. Each of these explanations
suggests that deterrence is not working as theory predicts. 102
The data fails to confirm the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis #3
Corporations who are informed about lawsuits filed against
their competitors and who rely upon this information in making
their own business decisions will successfully change their
conduct to avoid subsequent similar litigation.
The following questions focus on whether litigation against a
competitor induces an actor who has not yet been the target of
enforcement to change its conduct to avoid future liability:

102

It is possible that deterrence theory is working. Some of the multigenerational litigation involving repeat defendants may involve situations
where the cost of prevention is greater than the avoidable cost of litigation. In
this scenario, companies will rationally choose to not invest in precautions,
knowing that they will have to shoulder the burden of litigation if harm
materializes. While this is consistent with deterrence theory, it is hard to
believe that this scenario offers an explanation for all of the Respondents who
have been repeat defendants in multiple generations of the same or a similar
suit.
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Please rate your company’s awareness of class actions against
your competitors (these are class actions in which you are NOT
named as a defendant) 103
The response to this question indicates that Respondents
believe they are fairly well informed about class actions within their
industry. Specifically, 46.9% of Respondents rate their awareness of
class actions against competitors as high, 32.7% rate their awareness as
moderate, and 20.4% rate their awareness of class actions against
competitors as low. 104 From an industry perspective, the companies
who rate their awareness as high hail from 19 industries, 105 the
companies who rate their awareness as moderate hail from 15
industries, 106 and the companies who rate their awareness as low hail
from 9 industries. 107 Interestingly, Respondents within a single industry
do not necessarily report the same level of awareness. For example
among the four Respondents representing the industry “Utility: Gas and
Electric,” two reported their awareness as high (7 and 9) and two
reported their awareness as low (2 and 3). Similarly, among the three
Respondents representing the industry “Food: Consumer Products”, one
Respondent reported awareness as high (7), one Respondent reported
awareness as moderate (6) and one Respondent reported awareness as
low (3). Overall, the data suggests that participants in the same
103

The response scale ranges from “1 = Almost No Awareness” to “10 = Very
Aware.” See Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 2.
104
Based upon 49 responses, 23 Respondents rate their awareness between 7
– 10; 11 Respondents rate their awareness between 4 – 6; and ten
Respondents rate their awareness between 1 – 3. A 95% confidence interval is
+/-8%.
105
The Respondents who report the highest awareness of class action litigation
against their competitors represent the following industries: education;
pharmaceuticals; construction and farm machines; insurance: life and health;
insurance: property and casualty; information technology services;
telecommunications; food: consumer products; general merchandise; specialty
retailer; utility: gas and electric; electronic equipment; automotive retailing and
service; food: wholesale; mining, crude oil products; scientific, photographic
and control equipment; entertainment; commercial bank; and internet
services.
106
The Respondents who report moderate awareness of class action litigation
against their competitors represent the following industries: communication
equipment; medical products; construction and farm machines; insurance: life
and health; engineering and construction; health care: medical facilities; motor
vehicle and parts; food: consumer products; chemicals; pipelines; electronic
equipment; aerospace and defense; automotive retailing services; financial
data services; and computer services.
107
The Respondents who report the lowest awareness of class action litigation
against their competitors represent the following industries: metals;
communication equipment; food: consumer products; industrial machinery;
utility: gas and electric; chemicals; electronic equipment; aerospace and
defense; automotive retailing services.
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industry do not necessarily undertake the same effort to become aware
of class action litigation against their competitors. 108
The Questionnaire also asks:
Please rate the quality of information (level of detail, reliability,
accuracy, etc.) that your company learns about the legal
theories and factual assertions in class actions against your
competitors. 109
The response to this question suggests that many Respondents
believe the quality of information they possess about class actions
against their competitors is relatively strong. Indeed, 44.7% of
Respondents rate the quality of information they possess as high, 46.8%
rate the quality of information as moderate, and only 8.5% rate the
quality of information as low. 110 From an industry perspective, the
Respondents who rate the quality of information they possess as high
hail from 18 industries, 111 Respondents who rate the quality of
information they possess as moderate hail from 17 industries, 112 and
Respondents who rate the quality of information they possess as low
108

Of the twelve industries represented by more than one Respondent, eight
industries have Respondents who rate their awareness in a different category
(high, moderate, or low) than another Respondent from the same industry.
These eight industries are: construction and farm machines; communication
equipment; food: consumer products; utility: gas and electric; chemicals;
electronic equipment; automotive retailing and service; insurance: life and
health.
109
The response scale ranges from “1 = The quality of information is very poor”
to “10 = The quality of information is excellent.” See Questionnaire, Appendix
A, question 4.
110
Based upon 47 responses, 21 Respondents rate the quality of information
they possess between 7 – 10; 22 Respondents rate the quality of information
they possess between 4 – 6; and four Respondents rate the quality of
information they possess between 1 – 3. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 8%
111
The Respondents who report the highest quality of information regarding
class action litigation against their competitors represent the following
industries: insurance: property and casualty; education; pharmaceuticals;
construction and farm machines; insurance: life and health; information
technology services; food: consumer products; computer services;
entertainment; general merchandise; specialty retailer; utility: gas and electric;
pipelines; electronic equipment; food: wholesale; mining, crude oil products;
commercial bank; and internet services and retailing.
112
The Respondents who report moderate quality of information regarding
class action litigation against their competitors represent the following
industries: metals; communication equipment; medical products; construction
and farm machines; insurance: life and health; engineering and construction;
health care: medical facilities; motor vehicles and parts; telecommunications;
food: consumer products; utility: gas and electric; chemicals; electronic
equipment; aerospace and defense; automotive retailing and service; financial
data services; and scientific, photographic and control equipment.
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hail from 3 industries. 113 Again, Respondents from the same industry
do not necessarily rate the quality of information they possess similarly.
For example, Respondents representing “Utility: Gas and Electric” rate
the quality of information they possess about class actions against their
competitors from the very low to the very high (four Respondents rated:
1, 3, 5, 9). 114
Of course, a company that possesses high quality information
about class actions against its competitors will not be deterred from
wrongful conduct unless it considers this information in making its own
business decisions. Thus, the follow question asks:
Please rate the relevance of the information you acquire about
class actions against your competitors to your company’s
business decisions: (emphasis in original) 115
Here, 41.7% of Respondents report that information about class actions
against competitors is highly relevant to their own business decisions,
25% report that such information is moderately relevant to their own
business decisions, and 33.3% report that such information is not very
relevant to their own business decisions. 116 Those who report that the
information is highly relevant to their own business decisions hail from
16 industries, 117 those who report that the information is moderately
relevant hail from 9 industries, 118 and those who report that the
113

The Respondents who report the lowest quality of information regarding
class action litigation against their competitors represent the following
industries: motor vehicles and parts; utility: gas and electric; and aerospace and
defense.
114
Of the 12 industries that are represented by more than one Respondent,
five industries include at least one Respondent that rates the quality of
information they possess in a different category than another Respondent in
that same industry. These five industries are: construction and farm
equipment; food: consumer products; utility: gas and electric; electronic
equipment; and insurance: life and health.
115
The response scale ranges from “1 = Not relevant” to “10 = Highly relevant.”
See Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 5.
116
Based upon 48 responses, twenty Respondents rate the relevance of such
information between 7 – 10; twelve Respondents rate the relevance of such
information between 4 – 6; and sixteen Respondents rate the relevance of such
information between 1 – 3. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 8%.
117
The Respondents who report that information about class actions against
competitors is highly relevant to their own business decisions represent the
following industries: education; pharmaceuticals; insurance: life and health;
information technology services; motor vehicles and parts; food: consumer
products; general merchandise; specialty retailer; utility: gas and electric;
chemicals; pipelines; electronic equipment; food: wholesale; computer
services; entertainment; internet services and retailing.
118
The Respondents who report that information about class actions against
competitors is moderately relevant to their own business decisions represent
the following industries: construction and farm machines; insurance: life and
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information is of low relevance hail from 13 industries. 119 Moreover,
Respondents within a single industry report varying degrees of reliance
upon class action information against their competitors in making their
own business decisions. 120
Not surprisingly, there is a relationship between the quality of
information possessed and Respondents’ willingness to rely on that
information. Specifically, Respondents who have high quality
information overwhelmingly report that the information is highly
relevant to their own business decisions. 121 Overall, 16 Respondents
reportedly possess high quality information concerning class actions
against their competitors that is also highly relevant to their own
decision making, and 33 Respondents reportedly possess low or
moderate quality information that is not highly relevant to their own
business decisions. If deterrence theory holds water, the 16
Respondents who rely upon high quality information about class actions
against their competitors in making their own business decisions should
be named in fewer suits than the 33 Respondents who have lower
quality information and/or find the information less relevant to business
decisions. [For ease of discussion, the 16 Respondents will be referred
to as “The Best Practices Group” and the 33 Respondents will be
referred to as “The Common Practices Group”]. The following
questions probe this hypothesis.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a
defendant in a First Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
(emphasis in original)

health; insurance: property and casualty; health care: medical facilities; food:
consumer products; electronic equipment; automotive retailing services;
mining, crude oil products; and scientific, photographic and control equipment.
119
The Respondents who report that information about class actions against
competitors are of low relevance to their own business decisions represent the
following industries: metals; communication equipment; medical products;
engineering and construction; motor vehicles and parts; telecommunications;
utility: gas and electric; chemicals; electronic equipment; aerospace and
defense; automotive retailing and service; financial data services; and
commercial banks.
120
Of the 12 industries with multiple Respondents, six industries have at least
one Respondent who rates the relevance of information about class actions
against competitors in a different category than another Respondent from the
same industry. These industries are: food: consumer products; utility: gas and
electric; chemicals; electronic equipment; automotive retailing and service; and
insurance: life and health.
121
Specifically, of the 21 Respondents who report possessing high quality
information about class action litigation involving competitors, 16 of them
report that such information is highly relevant to their own business decisions,
4 report that such information is moderately relevant to their own business
decisions and only 1 reports that such information is of low relevance.
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The responses to this question indicate that 35.4% of all Respondents
have been named as defendants in a First Generation Action, while
64.6% have not been named in such suits. 122 Among The Best Practices
Group of Respondents, 37.5% have been named as defendants in a First
Generation Action, and 62.5% have not been named in such an
action. 123 Among The Common Practices Group of Respondents, 34.4%
have been named in a First Generation Action, and 65.6% have not been
named in such an action. 124 Overall, Respondents from 14 industries
were named as defendants in First Generation Actions, with 8 industries
represented by Respondents in The Best Practices Group 125 and 10
industries represented by Respondents in The Common Practices
Group. 126
The data suggests that The Best Practices Group of Respondents
have no advantage in avoiding First Generation Actions, with 62.5% of
the Best Practice Group reporting that they have never been named as a
defendant in a First Generation Action and 65.6% of the Common
Practices Group reporting that they have never been named as a
defendant in a First Generation Action. 127 This is not surprising when
122

The question called for a “Yes” or “No” response. Based upon 48 responses,
seventeen Respondents report that they have been sued in a First Generation
action. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 13.5%. Questionnaire, Appendix A,
question 13.
123
Because the number of Respondents who meet defining characteristics of
The Best Practices Group is only 16, a 95% confidence interval is +/- 24%.
Further study is necessary to narrow the confidence intervals.
124
Because the number of Respondents who meet defining characteristics of
The Common Practices Group is 33, a 95% confidence interval is +/- 16.5%.
Further study is necessary to narrow the confidence intervals.
125
In The Best Practices Group, Respondents from the following industries
report having been named in a First Generation action: insurance: life and
health; food: consumer products; general merchandise; utility: gas and electric;
electronic equipment; food: wholesale; computer services; and entertainment.
126
In The Common Practices Group, Respondents from the following industries
report having been named in a First Generation action: communication
equipment; construction and farm equipment; insurance: life and health;
insurance: property and casualty; health care: medical facilities; food:
consumer products; utility: gas and electric; electronic equipment; automotive
retailing and service; and commercial bank.
127
The Questionnaire also asks:
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant
in First Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions? (emphasis in original)
Three verbal category responses were: “infrequently (approximately 3 or
fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “A moderate number of times
(approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “Frequently (more
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one considers that First Generation Actions involve novel assertions that
have not been aired in previous litigation. While The Best Practices
Group does a better job learning about previous class actions against
their competitors and using that information in making business
decisions than The Common Practices Group, this effort is not likely to
help them anticipate the novel theories that are the subject of First
Generation Actions. One would expect the data to be very different for
Second Generation Actions, which are the subject of the following
question:
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a
defendant in a Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
(emphasis in original)
The response to this question indicates that 58.3% of all
Respondents have been named in a Second Generation Action. 128
Among The Best Practices Group of Respondents, 56.3% have been sued
in a Second Generation Action and 43.8% have not been named in a
Second Generation Action. 129 Among The Common Practices Group of
Respondents, 59.4% of The Common Practices Group Respondents have
been sued in a Second Generation Action and 40.6% have not been
named in such an action. 130

than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”. Questionnaire, Appendix A,
Question 14.
The data shows that among the Best Practices Group, 5 Respondents (62.5%)
answered that they were named as a defendant in a First Generation Action
“infrequently”, 2 Respondents (25%) answered that they were named as a
defendant in a First Generation Action a “moderate number of times” and 1
Respondent (12.5%) answered that it was named as a defendant in a First
Generation Action “frequently.” In the Common Practices Group, 11
Respondents (78.6%) answered that they were named as a defendant in a First
Generation Action “infrequently”, 2 Respondents (14.3%) answered that they
were named as a defendant in a First Generation Action a “moderate number
of times” and 1 Respondent (7.1%) answered that it was named as a defendant
in a First Generation Action “frequently.” Unfortunately, because the number
of Respondents that have been named in First Generation Actions is so small
(particularly the Best Practices Group with only 8 Respondents) no statistically
significant comparison of frequency can be drawn.
128

Specifically, 28 Respondents report being sued in a Second Generation
Action and 20 Respondents report never being sued in a Second Generation
Action. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 13.5%. Questionnaire, Appendix A,
question 18.
129
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 24%.
130
A 95% confidence interval is +/- 16.5%.
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The data raises several interesting points worth noting. The
overall percentage of Respondents named in Second Generation Actions
is higher than the overall number of Respondents named in First
Generation Actions (58.3% compared to 35.4%). This makes sense
when we consider that Second Generation Actions benefit from the
novel claims that are tested in First Generation Actions. Once a novel
claim has been litigated in a First Generation Action, the theory can be
copied and litigated repeatedly in Second Generation suits. Thus, the
fact that more Respondents report being sued in a Second Generation
Action is expected.
A slightly larger percentage of The Best Practices Group (43.8%)
has never been named in a Second Generation Action than The
Common Practices Group (40.6%). This is precisely the opposite of what
the data showed with regard to First Generation Actions, where a
slightly smaller percentage of The Best Practices Group (62.5%) has
never been named as a defendant in a First Generation Action than The
Common Practices Group (65.6%). One possible explanation for this
reversal is that deterrence is working more effectively in The Best
Practices Group than it is in The Common Practices Group. To the
extent that The Best Practices Group is collecting and relying upon high
quality information about class action litigation against their
competitors, and The Common Practices Group is not, we would expect
The Best Practices Group to reduce its likelihood of being sued in a
Second Generation Action as compared to The Common Practices
Group. The data suggests, however, that the effect of collecting and
relying upon high quality information about class actions against
competitors is quite modest. 131
131

The Questionnaire also asks:
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant
in Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions? (emphasis in
original)

Three verbal category responses were: “infrequently (approximately 3 or
fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “A moderate number of times
(approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “Frequently (more
than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”. Questionnaire, Appendix A,
Question 19.
The data shows that among the Best Practices Group, 6 Respondents (66.7%)
answered that they were named as a defendant in a Second Generation Action
“infrequently”, 3 Respondents (33.3%) answered that they were named as a
defendant in a Second Generation Action a “moderate number of times” and 0
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It is possible that the Respondents in The Best Practices Group
would have been sued more than the Respondents in The Common
Practices Group but for the efforts taken to reduce their exposure to
such suits. Since The Best Practices Group was approximately 3% more
likely to be sued in a First Generation Action than The Common
Practices Group, we might assume that The Best Practices Group of
Respondents hail from industries that shoulder greater exposure to
class action litigation than The Common Practices Group of
Respondents. Using this as a baseline, we might assume that The Best
Practices Group should be approximately 3% more likely to be sued in a
Second Generation Action than The Common Practices Group. Thus, if
40.6% of Respondents from The Common Practices Group have never
been sued in a Second Generation Action, we might predict that only
37.6% of The Best Practices Group would never have been sued in a
Second Generation Action but for the efforts taken to reduce exposure.
Under these assumptions, the efforts taken by The Best Practices Group
resulted in an approximately 6% reduction in exposure from the
baseline prediction.
When we focus on Third Generation Actions, however, the data
shifts in a surprising manner:
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a
defendant in a Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
(emphasis in original)
The response to this question indicates that 48.9% of all
Respondents have been named as a defendant in a Third Generation
action and 51.1% have not been named in such an action. 132 If we
isolate The Best Practices Group, 53.3% have been named as a
defendant in a Third Generation action, and 46.7% have never been
answered that they were named as a defendant in a Second Generation Action
“frequently.” In the Common Practices Group, 15 Respondents (68.2%)
answered that they were named as a defendant in a Second Generation Action
“infrequently”, 5 Respondents (22.7%) answered that they were named as a
defendant in a Second Generation Action a “moderate number of times” and 2
Respondents (9.1%) answered that they were named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Action “frequently.” Unfortunately, because the number of
Respondents that have been named in Second Generation Actions is so small
(particularly the Best Practices Group with only 9 Respondents) no statistically
significant comparison of frequency can be drawn.
132

Among the 45 responses to the question, 23 have been named in a Third
Generation Action and 22 have not been named in such an action. A 95%
confidence interval is +/- 14%. Questionnaire, Appendix A, question 24.
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named in such an action. 133 Among The Common Practices Group,
46.9% have been named in a Third Generation action, and 53.1% have
never been named in such an action. 134
The data suggests that the overall percentage of Respondents
named in Third Generation Actions is lower than the overall percentage
of Respondents named in Second Generation Actions (48.9% compared
to 58.3%). This is not surprising when we consider that Third
Generation Actions benefit from the legal and factual issues that have
been resolved in Second Generation suits. At this stage of maturity, the
outcome of litigation is more predictable and weak claims are not likely
to be filed. Indeed, for precisely this reason we would expect that
companies who collect and rely upon high quality information regarding
class action litigation against their competitors will avoid being sued in
Third Generation Actions more successfully than the Common Practices
Group. Yet, the data fails to support this notion. Indeed, the data
indicates that 46.7% of the Respondents in The Best Practices Group
have never been sued in a Third Generation Action, while a significantly
larger percentage (53.1%) of Respondents in the Common Practices
Group have never been sued in a Third Generation Action. This is
precisely the opposite of the data for Second Generation Actions. To the
extent that the data supports a slight deterrent effect in Second
Generation Actions, the data fails to support this conclusion in Third
Generation Actions. 135
133

Among the 16 Respondents in The Best Practices Group, nine have been
sued in a Third Generation Action and seven have not been named in such an
action. A 95% confidence interval is +/- 24%.
134
Among the 33 Respondents in The Common Practices Group, 32 responded
to this question. Fifteen Respondents report that they have been sued in a
Third Generation Action, and seventeen Respondents report that they have not
been sued in a Third Generation Action. A 95% confidence interval is 16.5%.
135
The Questionnaire also asks:
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant
in Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions? (emphasis in original)
Three verbal category responses were: “infrequently (approximately 3 or
fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “A moderate number of times
(approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”; “Frequently (more
than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)”. Questionnaire, Appendix A,
Question 25.
The data shows that among the Best Practices Group, 6 Respondents (66.7%)
answered that they were named as a defendant in a Third Generation Action
“infrequently”, 2 Respondents (22.2%) answered that they were named as a
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The data fails to confirm the hypothesis that Corporations who
are informed about lawsuits filed against their competitors and who rely
upon this information in making their own business decisions will
successfully change their conduct to avoid subsequent similar litigation.
Overall, the data collected in this study supports the notion that
a relationship exists between litigation maturity and deterrence.
Corporations report that it is easier to anticipate a risk of future liability
when there is a well-developed record of the factual and legal issues
from previous litigation than when there is no track record from
previous litigation. In light of this finding, however, it is somewhat
surprising that over three quarters of the Respondents have been sued
in multiple generations of the same or a similar suit. Equally surprising
is the finding that corporations armed with high quality information
about previous litigation against their competitors are virtually no more
successful in avoiding subsequent litigation than corporations who lack
this information. The following section draws upon these conclusions to
analyze relevant policy implications.
IV.

Policy Implications

This paper offers new evidence to answer the primary question
that has swirled around negative value class actions for decades: when,
if ever, does the social utility derived from these actions outweigh “the
limited benefits to individuals, the aroma of gross profiteering, and the
transactional costs to the court.” 136 The answer to this question hinges
on deterrence. When wrongful conduct is deterred, there is no need for
litigation, no transactional costs imposed on the courts and no
attorney’s fees to create an “aroma of gross profiteering.” 137 It is only
when wrongful conduct is not deterred that these costs arise.

defendant in a Third Generation Action a “moderate number of times” and 1
Respondent (11.1%) answered that it was named as a defendant in a Third
Generation Action “frequently.” In the Common Practices Group, 10
Respondents (58.8%) answered that they were named as a defendant in a Third
Generation Action “infrequently”, 6 Respondents (35.3%) answered that they
were named as a defendant in a Third Generation Action a “moderate number
of times” and 1 Respondent (5.9%) answered that it was named as a defendant
in a Third Generation Action “frequently.” Unfortunately, because the number
of Respondents that have been named in Third Generation Actions is so small
(particularly the Best Practices Group with only 9 Respondents) no statistically
significant comparison of frequency can be drawn.
136

John P. Frank, Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to the Honorable Patrick E.
Higginbothom (Apr. 28, 1995)(on file with the Advisory Committee).
137
Id.
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The data presented in this paper suggests that negative value
class actions have not been as effective at deterring wrongful conduct
as theory predicts them to be. Before we conclude that these actions
are ineffective deterrents, however, we must consider whether
corporations are partly to blame for the disappointing deterrence
statistics. Indeed, with 84% of Respondents reporting that they have
been named as a defendant in multiple generations of the same (or a
similar) dispute and a majority of Respondents reporting that they do
not collect high quality information about class actions against their
competitors and/or consider such information when making their own
business decisions, it is impossible to conclude that these corporations
are investing their best efforts to avoid liability. While this data
indicates there is room for improvement, the data also indicates that
corporations who take extra effort to collect and rely upon quality
information about class actions against their competitors are sued at
approximately the same rate as those who do not. These mixed results
suggest that much work needs to be done to determine the types of
information that will best enable corporations to avoid future liability
and to encourage corporations to make these efforts. To the extent
that the data presented in this study brings attention to areas of
weakness and highlights action that may be taken to address these
weaknesses, everyone wins. Corporations do not want to be sued in
negative value class actions any more than society wants to bear the
expense associated with them. If this study motivates corporations to
take efforts to improve deterrence, the study will have accomplished a
great deal.
Even with increased efforts, however, it is likely that some
informational deficiencies will persist and actual deterrence will remain
less than predicted deterrence. Thus, we return to the basic question:
does the social utility of negative value class actions exceed their cost?
Social utility is maximized when deterrence is increased and litigation is
decreased. As long as an opportunity for class action treatment exists,
the threat of liability from a negative value class action will encourage
some level of deterrence. When wrongful conduct is deterred, litigation
is unnecessary and the associated costs are not incurred. When
wrongful conduct is not deterred, however, we must consider if the
value derived from litigating a class of small value claims justifies the
associated costs. To the extent that Rule 23 seeks to respond to “the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights,” 138
negative value class actions are intended to serve a valuable social
purpose. Indeed, when claimants have a desire to adjudicate their
claims, negative value class actions enable claimants to enforce their

138

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)(discussing the
policy underlying negative value class actions).
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legal rights. 139 Few would contest that negative value class actions
confer social utility under these circumstances. When claimants lack
the desire to adjudicate their claims, however, negative value class
actions create needless litigation and confer little, if any, social value. 140
Indeed, it is only when a reasonable proportion of the proposed class –
something that represents more than a handful or smattering -- has a
desire to prosecute their claims, that we can be sure a negative value
class action is serving the social function that was intended at the time
the modern class action rule was adopted. Thus, the next big question
surrounding negative value class actions should be: how can a certifying
court determine if a reasonable proportion of a proposed class has a
desire to adjudicate? This question reaches beyond the subject of this
paper, but sets the stage for future research.

Conclusion
This paper presents compelling evidence to answer the question
that has plagued negative value class actions for nearly half a century:
when, if ever, does the social utility of these actions outweigh their
cost? The empirical study that is the subject of this paper focuses on the
relationship between litigation maturity and deterrence by testing three
inter-related hypotheses: (1) future liability is easier to anticipate when
there is a well-developed record of the factual and legal issues from
previous litigation than when there is no track record from previous
litigation; (2) corporations who have been held liable for particular
conduct will successfully change their conduct to avoid future litigation
regarding similar conduct; (3) corporations who are informed about
lawsuits filed against their competitors, and who rely upon this
information in making their own business decisions, will successfully
change their conduct to avoid subsequent similar litigation. The new
data suggests that although there is a relationship between litigation
maturity and deterrence, corporations are not successfully protecting
themselves from future litigation by relying upon information learned
from earlier suits.

139

For example, a $5,000 loss may be too small to justify the expense of
individual litigation but most claimants would be motivated to pursue a
recovery if they could join in a class.
140
A class action lawyer’s incentive may not always coincide with the desires of
potential class members. Taking an extreme example, most claimants would
be ambivalent about pursuing litigation for a loss of ten cents. Yet, if enough
claimants have similar claims, the aggregate loss may create an incentive for a
lawyer to file a class action. If such a class is certified, the social benefit
(pennies recovered by each class member) will be far outweighed by the
transactional costs imposed on the courts and the appearance of profiteering
by the class action attorney.
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APPENDIX A

Small-Stakes Class Action Survey
I.

Introduction

The goal of this study is to refine our understanding of the relationship between small-stakes
class action litigation and the prevention of injury.
II.

Definitions

For purposes of this survey, please apply the following definitions in answering the questions:
“Small-Stakes Class Actions” join together claims that cannot be economically litigated on an
individual basis because each claim for relief is insufficient to cover the costs of litigation.
Individual claims may seek damages ranging from a few pennies to several thousand dollars.
Once joined together into a class, these claims become viable because the cost of litigation is
spread among a large group of class members.
“First Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions that involve
novel legal theories and/or unproven factual scenarios.
“Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions that involve
legal theories and factual scenarios that have been previously argued in other cases but have not
been definitively resolved. Thus while the case theories are not novel, ambiguity exists
regarding the interpretation of important legal questions and/or the existence of evidentiary
support for factual allegations.
“Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions” are small-stakes class actions that involve
legal theories and factual scenarios that have been the subject of earlier class actions and enjoy
fairly well developed legal and factual support from previous litigation. While some level of
ambiguity persists, third generation class actions enjoy the most robust information from which
to predict the likely outcome of a suit.
**Please note: The following questions do not ask you to categorize specific class actions into
one of these categories. Rather, the questions seek general impressions regarding your
experience with class actions at various stages of maturity. The questions ask you to gauge the
maturity of class actions in which you have been involved according to your own knowledge
and impressions. It is NOT necessary to conduct research to supplement your knowledge of
earlier generations of class actions to respond to these questions.
“You” refers to the entity or corporation on whose behalf you are responding.
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III.
Completed Surveys
Please return all survey responses to:
Professor Linda Simard
Suffolk University Law School
120 Tremont St.
Boston, MA 02108-4977
IV.

Questions

1.

Please state your company’s industry:

2.
Please rate your company's awareness of class actions against your competitors (these are
class actions in which you are NOT named as a defendant):

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1= Almost No Awareness (We generally don’t learn about class actions against our competitors)
10 = Very Aware (We learn about all class actions against our competitors very soon after they
are filed)
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________
3.
Does your company have a system in place to learn about class actions against your
competitors? (i.e. a formal or informal network of general counsels, a trade organization, etc)
Yes
No
Comment:(please describe the system)
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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4.
Please rate the quality of information (level of detail, reliability, accuracy, etc.) that your
company learns about the legal theories and factual assertions in class actions against your
competitors:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = The quality of information is very poor.

10 = The quality of information is excellent.
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
5.
Please rate the relevance of the information you acquire about class actions against your
competitors to your company's business decisions:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = Not relevant
10 = Highly relevant
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
6.

Please rate the effectiveness of small-stakes class actions in regulating your
competitors' conduct (for example, do small-stakes class actions deter your
competitors from breaking legal rules to gain a competitive advantage?):

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = Small-stakes class actions have not been effective in regulating our competitors' conduct.

10 = Small-stakes class actions have been very effective in regulating our competitors' conduct.
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Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

7.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a defendant in a small-stakes
class action filed in a state or federal court in the United States that includes foreign citizens
(non U.S. citizens) as class members?
a.

No (please go on to question 9)

b.

Yes

8.
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant in small-stakes class
actions filed in state or federal court in the United States that include foreign citizens as class
members?
a.

Almost never (approximately 0- 1 case in any 5 year period of time)

b.

Infrequently (approximately 2-3 cases in any 5 year period of time)

c.

A moderate number of times (approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of
time)

d.

Frequently (more than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)
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9.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a defendant in a small-stakes
judicial action filed in a court outside of the United States (i.e. an action involving a large
number of people alleging small-stakes injuries)?
a.

No

b.

Yes.

If yes, please rate your impressions of the process offered in these forums (efficiency,
opportunity to present your case, outcome, availability of appellate review, etc)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = Quality of the process was poor
10 = Quality of the process was excellent
Comments: (please identify the countries where the proceedings occurred)
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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10.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been the subject of a non judicial legal
proceeding outside of the United States to redress a large scale, small-stakes dispute (ie. an
administrative or regulatory proceeding)?
a.

No

b.

Yes

If yes, please rate your impressions of the process offered in these forums (efficiency,
opportunity to present your case, outcome, availability of review or reconsideration, etc.)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = Quality of the process was poor
10 = Quality of the process was excellent

Comments: (please identify the countries where the proceedings occurred)
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
11.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been the subject of a legal proceeding
outside of the United States (judicial or non judicial) regarding a dispute that had previously
been the subject of a class action suit in the United States?
a.

No

b.

Yes

If yes, did the foreign forum recognize the US class action judgment and accord it preclusive
effect?
a.

No

b.

Yes
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12.
Do you believe that your foreign competitors have a competitive advantage over your
company because they are less likely to be named as defendants in small-stakes class actions
filed in state or federal courts in the United States?
a.

No

b.

Yes

13.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a defendant in a First
Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
a.

No (please go on to question 18)

b.

Yes

14.
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant in First Generation
Small-Stakes Class Actions?
a.

Infrequently (approximately 3 or fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)

b.

A moderate number of times (approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of
time)

c.

Frequently (more than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)

15.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
First Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal and
factual claims at the time of the event or business decision that later became the subject of the
class action suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1= We generally have not anticipated the legal and/or factual claims of First Generation SmallStakes Class Actions.
10 = We generally have anticipated the legal and factual claims of First Generation Small-Stakes
Class Actions.
Comments:________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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16.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
First Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success on the merits at the time of the event or business decision that later became
the subject of the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = We have not been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in First
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in First
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions.
Comments:________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
17.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
First Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the
magnitude of the potential liability at the time of the event or business decision that later became
the subject of the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1= We have not been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the
time of the underlying event or decision.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the time
of the underlying event or decision.
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
18.

To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
a.

No (please go on to question 24)

b.

Yes
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19.
How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant in Second
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions?
a.

Infrequently (approximately 3 or fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)

b.

A moderate number of times (approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of
time)

c.

Frequently (more than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)

20.
When your company has been named as a defendant in a Second Generation SmallStakes Class Action, approximately how often has the company been named as a defendant in
the earlier generation of a similar dispute?
a.

Never

b.

Infrequently (between 1-3 times)

c.

Somewhat often (four or more times)

21.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal
and factual claims at the time of the event or business decision that later became the subject of
the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = We generally have not anticipated the legal and/or factual claims of Second Generation
Small-Stakes Class Actions.
10 = We generally have anticipated the legal and factual claims of Second Generation SmallStakes Class Actions.
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22.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the
plaintiffs' likelihood of success at the time of the underlying event or decision that later became
the subject of the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = We have not been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in Second
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in Second
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions.
Comments:________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
23.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Second Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the
magnitude of the potential liability to the class at the time of the underlying event or decision
that later became the subject of the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1= We have not been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the
time of the underlying event or decision.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the time
of the underlying event or decision.
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
24.
To your knowledge, has your company ever been named as a defendant in a Third
Generation Small-Stakes Class Action?
a.

No (please go on to question 30)

b.

Yes
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How frequently does your company tend to be named as a defendant in Third
Generation Small-Stakes Class Actions?
a.

Infrequently (approximately 3 or fewer cases in any 5 year period of time)

b.

A moderate number of times (approximately 4-10 cases in any 5 year period of
time)

c.

Frequently (more than 10 cases in any 5 year period of time)

26.
When your company has been named as a defendant in a Third Generation SmallStakes Class Action, approximately how often has the company been named as a defendant in
an earlier generation of a similar dispute?
a.

Never

b.

Infrequently (between 1 and 3 times)

c.

Relatively often (more than 4 times)

27.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to anticipate the legal
and factual claims at the time of the underlying event or decision that later became the subject of
the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1= We generally have not anticipated the legal and/or factual claims of Third Generation SmallStakes Class Actions.
10 = We generally have anticipated the legal and factual claims of Third Generation SmallStakes Class Actions.
Comments:________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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28.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success at the time of the underlying event or decision that later became the subject
of the suit:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = We have not been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in Third
Generation Small-Stakes Class Action.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in Third
Generation Small-Stakes Class Action.
Comments:________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
29.
With regard to the occasions when your company has been named as a defendant in a
Third Generation Small-Stakes Class Action, please rate your ability to estimate the
magnitude of the potential liability at the time of the underlying event or decision that later
became the subject of the suit:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = We have not been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the
time of the underlying event or decision.
10 = We have been able to accurately estimate the magnitude of the potential liability at the time
of the underlying event or decision.
Comment:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
30.
Please identify the factors that your company uses to determine whether to invest in
precautions that may reduce the likelihood of a class action suit:
(circle all that apply)
a.

Cost benefit analysis (invest in precautions when the cost of precaution < the
expected loss from a class action lawsuit)
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b.

Customer relations (invest in precautions to maintain good customer relations,
even when the cost of the precaution exceeds the expected loss from a class action
suit)

c.

Publicity (invest in precautions to avoid bad publicity, even when the cost of the
precaution exceeds the expected loss from a class action suit)

d.

Other (please describe below)

Comment:_______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
31.
Based upon your experience, please rate the quality of the procedures applied in smallstakes class action litigation in the United States (ie. efficiency, opportunity to present your case,
outcome, availability of review or reconsideration, etc.):

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 = Quality of the process is poor
10 = Quality of the process is excellent
32.
Please indicate if someone from your company would be willing to participate in a follow
up interview via telephone?
a.

No

b.

Yes (Please provide the name and contact information below)
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________

Please feel free to include any additional comments (in the space below, on the back of this page,
or on a separate sheet):
Thank you for your time in responding to these questions.
Please return all completed surveys to:
Professor Linda Simard
Suffolk University Law School
120 Tremont St.
Boston, MA 02108-4977
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APPENDIX B

October 24, 2011
Dear ______________:
I am writing to solicit 10-15 minutes of your time for a research project concerning so-called
"small-stakes class actions." The phrase “small-stakes class action” refers to a class action that joins
together claims that cannot be economically litigated on an individual basis because each claim for relief
is insufficient to cover the costs of litigation. When joined together into a class, these claims become
viable because the cost of litigation is spread among a large group of class members. Notwithstanding
the name “small-stakes class action,” these suits are anything but "small-stakes" to the defendants who
are threatened with massive liability.
Academic theory suggests that small-stakes class actions serve important societal goals.1 Yet,
very little empirical evidence exists to support or refute the academic theory. This study provides you
with an opportunity to provide valuable empirical evidence regarding the role small-stakes class actions
play in corporate decision making. The goal of this study is to refine our understanding of the
relationship between small-stakes class actions and the prevention of injury.
In exchange for your participation in the study, you will be provided with the survey results and
study conclusions. The survey is being sent to all Fortune 500 companies and a high response rate will
offer significant insights and valuable information regarding small-stakes class action litigation from the
defense perspective. In an effort to reduce the perceived risk associated with participation in the study,
all information collected from the study will maintain the anonymity of the participants in the study.
Specifically, all survey responses will be kept strictly confidential; results, calculations, and conclusions
will be communicated without attribution to any participant in the study (including information released
to study participants); and no individual company or counsel will be identified as a participant in the
study. Survey responses will be used to develop one or more scholarly papers discussing the results of
the study.
1

Specifically, small-stakes class actions are intended to: (1) minimize injury costs through prevention (deterrence)
and (2) compensate for injuries that are not prevented. Most class members receive relatively small compensation
from small-stakes class actions, making the deterrence function the primary rationale for these suits.
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I have enclosed a brief personal biography to provide you with information regarding my
scholarly background. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or comments.
Thank you for your contribution to the success of this study.
Sincerely,

Linda Sandstrom Simard
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APPENDIX C:

February 16, 2012

Dear (name):
Several months ago, I requested your participation in an empirical study on class action
litigation. Specifically, the study focuses on “negative value” or “small-stakes” class actions involving
class members who allege very small losses. These class actions involve individual claims that are too
small to justify individual suit because the cost of litigation exceeds the potential recovery for any
individual class member. Thus, class certification under these circumstances allows litigation that
otherwise would not be viable. This study seeks to determine when, if ever, these class actions make
sense. The study promises to make a significant contribution to the ongoing debate by collecting
empirical, anonymous, evidence from corporate decision makers who will provide a perspective that has
been noticeably absent from academic literature on the subject.
To date, a number of your colleagues at other Fortune 500 companies have participated in the
study. In order to generate credible results, however, I need your participation. I assure you that all
information collected from the study will maintain the anonymity of the participants in the study. All
survey responses will be kept strictly confidential; results, calculations and conclusions will be
communicated without attribution to any participant in the study; and no individual company or counsel
will be identified as a participant in the study. In exchange for your participation, I will provide you with
access to the study results and conclusions, without attribution or identification of participants. Survey
responses will be used to develop one or more scholarly papers for publication.
Thank you for your contribution to the success of this study. Please do not hesitate to contact
me with any questions or comments.

Sincerely,

Linda Sandstrom Simard
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